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Federal Civil Procedure - A Challenge
to the States
By ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF*
During the past hundred years vast strides have been made
in advancing various branches of substantive law in order to adjust personal and property rights and liabilities to the needs and
conditions of the times and to the changes in the social and economic structure of society A few examples will illustrate this
statement. Thus the legal rights of married women have been
formulated by Married Women s Acts in a manner to accord with
the modern point of view Compensation for injuries sustained
by employees in the course of their employment is no longer dependent on the employers negligence, but is almost universally
governed by a system of insurance under the Workmen s Compensation Acts.' The law of torts has been extended to create
new types of causes of action, such as, for example, a right to recover for the invasion of privacy, which has been recogmzed m a
number of States. In the field of contracts in many jurisdictions
a thrd party beneficiary of an agreement may sue for breach of
contract. These examples may be multiplied ad infinitum.
A substantive right, however, becomes at tunes but an empty
shell unless there is an efficacious means for enforcing and vindicating it. Consequently, an efficient, expeditious, and mexpensive type of judicial procedure, free of techncalities, is mdispensable m order to effectuate the rights and enforce the liabilities prescribed by substantive law Ever since the middle of the
19th Century, efforts have been made to clear away the morass
found in common law pleading and in old equity practice, which,
in effect, made compliance with rules of procedure an end m it0 A.B., M.A., LL.B., Columbia Umversity, judge, United States District Court
for the District of Columbia; formerly Special Assistant to the Attorney General
of the United States; Secretary of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Author: NEW FEUnmiA PRocEnURE Am THE COURTS

(1940), FEDERAL PROCE:DuRE FoRs (with Allen R. Cozier, 1940).

'Strangely enough, a striking exception is to be found in respect to employes
of interstate common earners, who still are relegated by the Federal Employers
Liability Act to actions at law for damages based on negligence.
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self. The science of pleading was indeed a beautiful and artistic
application of logic. Many a theoretical mind reveled in its precision. Unfortunately, however, the poor litigant was completely
forgotten in the process of determining whether his counsel properly prepared the pleadings.
In the 1870's England led the way by entirely jettisoning the
systems of common law and equity pleading and completely
revolutionizing judicial procedure in the civil courts. In the
United States, the Federal judiciary carried the torch of reform.
In 1934, as a culmination of a campaign carried on for a quarter
of a century, the Congress passed an enabling Act which granted
to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe uniform rules of
practice and procedure for the United States District Courts.
The Supreme Court promptly. exercised the authority conferred
upon it. It appointed an Advisory Committee of outstanding
members of the bar, who labored for several years in preparing a
draft of rules of civil procedure for the United States district
courts. The rules were adopted and promulgated by the Supreme
Court and became effective on September 1, 1938. This farreaching step resulted in what is probably the simplest type of
civil procedure in any Anglo-American jurisdiction.
Several States promptly followed the lead of the Federal
courts. Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico almost immediately
accepted the Federal procedure in toto. Subsequently, a few
other States, such as for example, Iowa and Delaware, followed
practically the same course. Within the past few years, New
Jersey, under the enlightened leadership of Chief Justice Arthur
T Vanderbilt, substantially adopted Federal civil procedure. In
passing it may be said that Chief Justice Vanderbilt has been
instrumental in transforming the judicial system of New Jersey
into one of the most progressive in the entire country A few
other States, such as Texas, Missouri, and Maryland adopted
some of the features of Federal procedure without assimilating
it in its entirety By and large, however, most of the States have
been lagging behind the Federal government and have not improved or simplified their procedure to the extent to which this
has been accomplished in the Federal courts. The Commonwealth of Kentucky is to be congratulated on undertaking at
this time a project of reforming its judicial procedure,
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It is but natural since the Federal courts have had about
twelve rears experience with the new procedure, that the States
should inquire as to the extent to which this reform has been 8uccessful before undertaking to adopt it. Perhaps the best workshop and the most effective laboratory in which to study the
new Federal procedure in operation is the District of Columbia,
because the District of Columbia is a Federal area and its courts
occupy a unique position. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia is one of eighty-six United States district courts in the continental United States. In the District of
Columbia, however, there are no tribunals of original jurisdiction
corresponding to State courts elsewhere.- The result is that in
addition to trying cases under its Federal jurisdiction, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia also handles all
civil actions that elsewhere come before State courts of original
jurisdiction. All civil suits that outside of the District of Columbia would be tried in a local court of original jurisdiction are disposed of in the District Court in the nation s capital. Divorce
cases, probate proceedings, administration of estates, actions for
damages, and all other matters of local jurisdiction are disposed
of in the United States District Court. It necessarily follows,
therefore, that the extent to which the new Federal procedure
has been effective and successful in the District of Columbia
should be of particular interest to the States. If it has proven its
value there, the argument that is sometimes advanced to the
effect that procedure suitable to the Federal courts is not necessarily fitting for State tribunals, would be completely refuted.
The bench and bar of the District of Columbia have found the
new procedure highly desirable in simplifying and expediting
litigation, without any sacrifice of the rights of the parties. The),
are practically unanimous in approving it.
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains the
following admonition. "They (i.e., the Rules) shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." This statement is no mere exhortation or an expression
In the District of Columbia there is a local Municipal Court, wluch has
limited jurisdiction, i.e., criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors and civil unsdiction over actions involving not over $3,000. All civil actions involving an
amount over $3,000 and all felonies are tried in the United States District Court.
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of a pious wish. Fortunately, Federal courts as a whole have
followed the spirit of this injunction and have interpreted and
applied the Rules with the flexibility and liberality that their
framers intended. The Rules are not to be regarded as rigid regulatons to be followed literally, but are to be applied flexibly
in a manner that would effectuate their spirit and achieve their
purpose, rather than comply with their exact letter. The result
has been that throughout the Federal judicial system technical
pleadings have been abolished and the so-called "sporting theory
of justice" has been reduced to a minimum. Preliminary motions
have been substantially minimized and a determination on the
merits of the litigation has been expeditiously attained. It should
be of interest to the States for the reasons stated above that these
results have been achieved in the District of Columbia quite as
fully as in other Federal jurisdictions.
It may be helpful to summarize and review the principal
features of the present Federal civil procedure. The keystone of
the arch is vesting in the judi .ary the right to regulate its own
procedure. One of the principal hindrances to procedural reform during the past century or wore, has been the insistence
on the part of legislative bodies of the exercise of their power to
regulate procedure in the courts. This anomaly is a comparatively modern development, for the earlier types of procedure
were evolved by the courts themselves. The restoration to the
courts of the power to regulate their own practice is indispensable to a permanent liberalization of judicial procedure.
What has been picturesquely denominated as legislative tinkering has been a constant bane in the field of adjective law One
of the reasons why the Field Code in New York did not attain
all of the results hoped for by its optimistic supporters, is to be
found in the fact that it left the control of procedure in the
hands of the legislature. The New York Code of Civil Procedure
became an ironclad detailed compilation of procedural rules
changed from time to time by sporadic Acts of the Legislature.
The courts were helpless to improve their own practice.
The farsighted leaders of the movement to reform Federal
procedure saw the necessity of vesting in the judiciary the right
to regulate judicial procedure. Surely the courts should be trusted
to do so. If they are to be responsible for the administration of
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justice, they must be accorded the means to carry out this task.
A campaign lasting about twenty-five years was required to convince the Congress of the desirability of vesting the necessary
authority in the judicial branch of the government. Finally,
under the leadership of Attorney General Cummings the enactment of the enabling Act was secured in 1934, conferring on the
highest court in the Federal judicial system the power to regulate Federal procedure throughout the Federal trial courts. Most
of those who are familiar with the lustory of Federal procedure
are strongly of the opimon that permanent reform of procedure
cannot be achieved without first vesting the rule-making power
in the judiciary itself, generally in the highest court of any judicial system. With this authority the highest court is in a position
not only to prescribe a simple procedural system, but also to
make changes and improvements in it when they become necessary as a result of experience. Legislative bodies whose attention
must of necessity be devoted to other matters are not in a position
to do so effectively
A number of States have already conferred upon their highest
courts the power to regulate judicial procedure. It can properly
be said without fear of successful contradiction that in most
States, if not all, in which this has been done the outcome has
been salutary It is hoped that Kentucky, which is now interesting itself in procedural reform, will give favorable consideration
to this principle. Candor requires the writer to say that there
are many States that are lagging behind in this movement and
that are still reluctant to trust their judiciary to the extent of peritting it to regulate its own procedure. Thus, the great State
of New York, which a century ago was the leader in the field of
reform of judicial procedure, today has dropped into the rear
ranks and has so far declined to confer the rule-making power
on the courts. The control of its procedure is still in the hands
of the legislature.
The next outstanding feature of the present Federal civil
procedure is the abolition of the distinction between law and
equity To be sure the system of code pleading, which was introduced in New York about a century ago and which rapidly
spread to many other States, especially those in the middle west
and far west, professed to abrogate all distimctions between law
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and equity In some of the States, however, this was done largely
only in respect to differences of forms of pleadings. There was
still a distinction between actions at law and suits m equity, although the forms of pleading for both became the same. If a
plaintiff erroneously sued in equity, when he should have sued
at law or vice versa, his pleading was still subject to dismissal.
Under the present Federal procedure, the merger of law and
equity is complete. It is immaterial whether the party prays for
legal or equitable relief, or whether he attempts to state a claim
for relief in equity or at law A complaint may no longer be dismissed on the ground that a party seeking equitable relief, has an
adequate remedy at law A party is awarded whatever type of
relief he shows by his proof at the trial to be entitled to.
The introduction of a simple, single form of civil action necessarily involves not only a coalescing of law and equity, but also
an abolition of various types of actions at law Procedural differences between actions in contract and actions in tort no longer
exist: Such conceptions as assumpsit, trover, detinue, have only
historical interest so far as Federal procedure is concerned. A
vast library of useless learning has been cast into oblivion. True
the old-fashioned pleader, who had the admiration of an artist
for his accomplishments, at times sighs with a feeling of nostalgia
for the "good old days" On the other hand, the administration
of justice is advanced and the rights of the litigants, who after all
are to be considered more than their counsel, are determined
more expeditiously and less expensively
All technical forms of pleading were abolished. All that a
pleading need do is to set forth in plain, simple English a short
statement of the claim, coupled with a short and clear statement
of the grounds on which the court's jurisdiction depends. In fact,
it is told of an opponent of the new procedure that he gave as a
reason for objecting to this reform that any high school graduate
would be able to draw a pleading under the new Rules. He did
not realize that he was paying a high tribute to an important accomplishment in the field of adjective law
The number of pleadings is reduced to a minimum. Ordinarily the only pleadings are a complaint and an answer. If the
defendant interposes a counterclaim, the plaintiff must file a
reply thereto. Therg are no further pleadings as between the
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plaintiff and the defendant. The court may indeed order the
filing of a reply to an answer, - something that is seldom asked
for and still more rarely granted.
The tiresome interchange of pleadings that existed at common law, ending with arrival at an issue after a consumption of
umecessarv time and the incurring of useless expense, is at an
end. Even the requirement of a reply to an affirmative defense,
which exists in some jurisdictions under code pleading, is no
part of Federal procedure. Demurrers are abolished. The sufficiency of a claim or defense may be tested by a motion, but if
on any possible theory the pleader may be entitled to relief,
such a motion is denied.
An important feature of the present Federal procedure is the
encouragement of bringing into a single law suit all possible
claims as between the contending parties. For this reason all
claims that the plaintiff has against the defendant may be joined
in a single complaint, irrespective of whether they sound in contract or in tort, or are based on legal or equitable grounds, or on
both, or are consistent with each other. The different claims
need not arise out of the same transaction, but may be entirely
disconnected from each other. By the same token, a defendant
may plead as a counterclaim any claim that he may have against
the plaintiff, irrespective of whether it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that forms the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim, and irrespective of whether it arises in contract or in
tort, or is based on a legal or equitable right. For example, in an
action for damages for libel, the defendant may counterclaim
for goods sold and delivered.
An outstanding feature of the reformed procedure is found
in liberal provisions for broad discovery The group of rules relating to this subject are of such importance as to justify some
discussion. They transformed the basic philosophy of litigation.
The doctrine previously prevailing was that each party to a law
suit was entitled to retain to himself whatever knowledge he had
of the pertinent facts and whatever evidence was in his possession, and to require his opponent to produce the necessary proof
in support of his claim or defense. It has been graphically denominated on occasion as "the sporting theory of justice" Under
the present Federal procedure, the fundamental principle is kept
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in mind that the purpose of litigation is to ascertain the truth
and to administer justice. To attain this objective all parties may
be required to disclose, prior to trial, whatever pertinent information and relevant evidence may be in their possession, subject
only to the rule of privilege. This doctrine bars a party from suppressing or failing to disclose information in his possession that
is germane to the issues. The element of surprise is reduced to a
minimum. Discovery is permissible not only for the purpose of
securing evidence, but also for the purpose of ascertaining what
evidence is in existence and where it may be obtained, as well
as names of possible witnesses. Unlike the limitation in some of
the States, discovery is permitted in respect to all of the issues
of the case, and is not limited to those as to which the party seeking discovery has the burden of proof. In order to achieve these
objectives several distinct remedies are provided: depositions,
which ordinarily may be taken on notice without an order of the
court, interrogatories; production and inspection of documentary
and other real evidence; requests for admissions; and physical
and mental examinations. Suitable weapons are accorded as
against a recalcitrant or unwilling party or witness. The utmost
liberality of discovery prevails. Nevertheless, since it is amenable to abuse, the court is clothed with ample authority to prevent harassment or vexation by appropriate orders. Broad and
liberal discovery may properly be said to be one of the outstanding achievements of the present procedure.
Another important innovation in Federal civil procedure
introduced by the Rules, is known as third-party practice. This
remedy is not entirely novel, for it had existed for many years in
the English courts, as well as in admiralty in this country More
recently, it had been introduced in a-few of the code States. Its
purpose is to avoid circuity of action insofar as is possible and to
permit the adjustment of all rights and liabilities, directly or indirectly, arising out of the same claim in a single law suit. By this
procedure a defendant may bring in as a third-party defendant
any person who is secondarily liable over to him in the event that
the plaintiff recovers as against the original defendant. Thus, the
defendant may bring in as a third-party defendant a person who
may be secondarily liable over to him for the entire amount of the
plaintiff's claim, as an indemnitor, guarantor, or surety, or who
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may be liable for a part of the claim by way of contribution.3
We now reach a topic which has received wide publicity and
a great deal of discussion, namely, pretrial. Its introduction into
the Federal courts was one of the notable accomplishments of
present Federal procedure. Pretrial procedure is m its essence
nothing more than a conference between the court and counsel
for both parties, at which the issues are simplified, matters concerning which there is no substantial controversy are eliminated,
and stipulations are entered into, - all for the purpose of simplifyng and shortening the trial. At first blush it would seem that
this course is so obvious as not to require a rule. One might well
argue that it does not rise to the dignity of an innovation or a reform. Yet it is one of the outstanding achievements of the present,
Federal procedure. As we all know, some of the greatest inventions m all fields appear so simple and obvious after they have
been made that one wonders why no one had thought of them
before. Nevertheless, tis circumstance does not detract from the
merits of the invention. These considerations are applicable to
pretrial.
For many years a procedure has prevailed in the English
courts known by the somewhat mystifying appellation of "summons for directions" It required parties to a law suit to appear
before a master promptly after the litigation was commenced, in
order to settle the pleadings and frame the issues. This practice
may be deemed a precursor of pretrial procedure, although in
England it is invoked at the beginning of litigation instead of
shortly preceding the trial, as is the usual course in the United
States. In tis country it was introduced more or less by accident, as is often true of inventions in other fields. In the late
1920's, the judges of the local State court in Detroit, found themselves confronted by a staggering and overwhelming load of cases
several years in arrears. In an effort to break the log jam and do
something to expedite the clogged docket, the court started a call
of all equity cases on the calendar with a view to an informal discussion as to each, in order to ascertain whether the case could be
"'The original third-part, rule (Rule 14) permitted a defendant to bring in
as a third-party not only any person who was secondarily liable to him, but also
any party who was liable directly to the plaintiff on the same claim as that on
which the suit was brought. The latter provision proved unworkable and was
eliminated by an amendment which became effective on March 19, 1948.
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disposed of without a trial, or, in any event, with a view to narrowing the issues and abbreviating the trial. This procedure
proved immediately successful and became a permanent feature
in the State courts in Detroit. Soon the State courts in Boston
inaugurated it, after observing the success that this procedure
attained in Detroit. It gradually came to be known as pretrial
practice.
The draftsmen of the Federal Rules had the results of the
Detroit and Boston experiments before them, and adopted a rule
for pretrial procedure. In view of its novelty the procedure was
not made mandatory, but was left to the discretion of each district.
The Federal rule authorizes the court to direct the attorneys in
•any case to appear before it for a conference in order to consider
the simplification of the issues, the necessity or desirability of
amendments to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents, which might avoid unnecessary
proof, the limitation of the number of expert witnesses, the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings, and such other matters as might aid in the disposition of
the action.
Some of the Federal courts, among them Massachusetts,
Oregon, and the District of Columbia, promptly took advantage
of this Rule. Perhaps the greatest use of pretrial procedure has
been made in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, which is a very busy tribunal with an exceedingly
heavv docket, the court being continuously in session except for a
summer recess during which it operates on a curtailed schedule.
The experience of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia may be of particular interest to the bench
and bar of the States, because, as previously indicated, this tribunal in addition to the usual cases ansing under its Federal
jurisdiction, also tries all cases that elsewhere would come before
State courts of general jurisdiction. In the District of Columbia
a rule was adopted and has been continuously in operation, requiring all cases, both jury cases and non-jury cases, to be pretried. Every case, shortly before it is reached for trial, first appears on the pretrial assignment and pretrial becomes a necessary routine. An exception is made only for matrimonial litigation and for actions against the Commissioner of Patents to require him to issue a patent. Whatever members of the bar may
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have thought of pretrial before it was inaugurated, the general
concensus of the bar of the District of Columbia today heartily
favors pretrial. Unlike a trial, a pretrial conference requires the
active participation of the judge. Without it a pretrial can hardly
accomplish the objective for which it is conducted.
The procedure followed in the District of Columbia is for
counsel for each party to state his contentions. The judge participates by asking questions of counsel to help in clarifying the
issues, as well as eliminating matters that may be controverted by
the pleadings but are not actually in dispute. The judge then and
there commences to dictate a pretrial order to a typist, first setting forth the issues to be tried, resulting from the discussion just
referred to. He then proceeds to obtam stipulations and admissions of facts and of documents. Frequently such stipulations
are suggested by counsel. Additional stipulations are often proposed by the judge, who, at the conclusion of this part of the discussion, dictates into the pretrial order all of the stipulations that
have been reached. Frequently as a result of the simplification
of the issues and the stipulations, the trial becomes very much
shortened. The parties then proceed to discuss further matters,
such as limitation of the number of expert witnesses, additional
discovery, amendments to the pleadings, and other similar topics.
All of the agreements reached are dictated into the pretrial order
by the judge. In the District of Columbia, at the conclusion of
the formal pretrial, an informal discussion generally follows for
the purpose of exploring the possibility of settlement. Members
of the bar are used to having the judge participate in this discussion and encourage the judge to help bring them together. Not
infrequently settlements are reached at the pretrial conference.
More often, the discussion leads to settlement subsequently to the
pretrial. Useful as settlements resulting from pretrials are, they
must of course be regarded as a by-product, for the real purpose
of pretrial is the simplification of issues and the shortening of
trials.4
Pretrial has been rapidly gaining ground throughout the Federal judicial system. Unfortunately again the States, although
first devising pretrial practice, have been lagging behind in the
'A recent book on "Pretrial" by Harry D. Nirns, is an exhaustive study of
the subject and should be required reading for everyone interested in the subject,
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procession and have not adopted it to the same extent as the
Federal courts. This is a matter that should be carefully studied
by those interested in the State courts, for it can be made exceedingly useful to litigants, who are the primary concern of the
courts. It can render justice less expensive and more expeditious.
Especially is this true in crowded metropolitan centers where arrears in dockets, especially n State courts, are the rule rather
than the exception.
In addition to the simplification of procedure, problems of
administration must be adequately solved, in order that trials and
disposition of cases may proceed smoothly, effectively, and expeditiously The operation of a multple-judge court with a heavy
docket involves many admimstrative considerations as is true of
the conduct of an executive department of the Government, or
of a big.corporation. Judicial adminstration is still in its infancy
Its importance has not been realized until recently It has had
its greatest development in the Federal judicial system and in the
State of New Jersey There must be a head to each judicial system, generally the Chief Judge or Chief Justice of the lughest
court, with authority to make temporary designations of judges
to serve outside of their home districts when the needs of the
dockets and other considerations so require. Within each multiple-judge court there must be an orgamzed system for handling
the docket. Some means, such as that provided by the reporting
system in the Federal courts, must exist to encourage judges not
to keep matters under advisement for a longer time than is reasonably necessary A few of the States have made partial progress toward the consummation of these ends. Most of them, however,
have done very little in that direction.
In every multiple-judge court there must be a unified admmistration of the dockets. What is sometimes called "the master calendar" system, consisting of a unified calendar from which cases,
when reached, are assigned to individual judges for trial as they
become disengaged, is indispensable. Such a system exists in
many metropolitan centers, both in the Federal and State courts.
This alone, however, is not sufficient. A single judge must be
clothed with the power of close supervision and administration of
the master calendar system. Illustrations may be found in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. In each of these courts there is an official known in one
instance as the Assignment Commissioner, and m the other as the
Calendar Commissioner, who devotes his entire time to the operation of the system. He acts under close supervision of the Chief
judge, who in one instance is known as the Assignment Judge,
and in the other instance as the Calendar Judge. All applications
for continuances are heard by the Assignment or Calendar Judge,
as the case may be, who exercises full control over the calendar
and who when necessary shifts judges from one type of cases to
another in order to make as much inroad on the dockets as possible. Both Chief Judge Bolitha J. Laws of the United States Distr'ict Court for the District of Columbia and Chief Judge John C.
Knox of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York are outstanding judicial administrators and have
done much for the cause of ]udicial administration. Recently, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Californma, under the inspiration of Judge Louis E. Goodman, has
also successfully adopted the master calendar system. Firm and
effective judicial administration is essential for the successful
handling of court dockets.
The administration of justice exists not for the benefit of the
bench or the bar, but for the welfare of the public. The interests
of litigants are paramount. Too often this obvious fact has been
overlooked in the past. The general public should be interested in
improving the administration of justice. Justice must be rendered
expeditious and inex-pensive. The attainment of these objectives
presents a challenge to the States. They must pick up the gauntlet
and follow the leadership of the Federal courts and of a few of
the progressive States. These reforms cannot be attained by
supine acquiescence. No progressive measure in any field is ever
adopted except under the leadership and through the dint of hard
work of individuals. The history of ]udicial reform, both in England and in the United States, demonstrates that it is invariably
some one or some few individuals whose initiative and energy
lead to the consummation of the desired result. Such men, as
Lord Brougham and Lord Selborne in England; and David
Dudley Field, Homer Cummings, and Arthur T. Vanderbilt in
this country, and a few others who might be named, are to be
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credited with these accomplishments. It is hoped that the outstanding leaders of the bar in each State will take up the struggle. Under their leadership and with the support of the bench
and bar generally, as well as of the public, the administration of
justice can rise to greater heights.

